May 30, 1997
Rabbinic Officiation at Same-Sex Commitment Ceremonies
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my wife Rabbi Deborah R. Prinz for encouraging me to explore the subject of rabbinic officiation at same-sex commitment ceremonies in greater depth, and from perspectives that I might not have ordinarily.
What follows is a variation of a talk she asked me to prepare for a forum at her synagog Temple Adat Shalom of Poway, CA, on Friday evening after services May 24, 1997. We had presumed, given my past involvement with the Gay and Lesbian Community, that I would have to convince myself of the opposing position in order to present it in a competent manner.
I researched the hucalum archives for the previous year's discussion of the subject and found little of a convincing nature. [I would love to post that material to have it available from here, but request the permission of those who shared there before I do so.] I asked for materials from those I knew of who had taken the opposing point of view and received some papers, most of which dealt with the subject only from the most general of perspectives, never taking the subject by the horns (to use a discreet metaphor). The most straightforward presentation I found was that by R. Brad Artson in his article in S'vara which all but comes out for Kiddushin for gay and lesbian couples but which I found seriously flawed (see below). The Pacific Southwest Council of the UAHC held a session on the subject at its 1997 biennial at which (so I am told) the organizers had difficulty finding someone to present the position in opposition to rabbinic officiation at same-sex commitment ceremonies. It is almost as though there is a fear, on the part of those opposed, to state their opposition and explain themselves. This has (as those who know me well) rarely been my problem.
There are some broader cultural issues that this exploration has encouraged me to consider; I have yet to gather them into words.
I present my thoughts here publicly as an attempt to further the discussion. Please share with me your responses. I hope to add links to appropriate sites on the WWW as I learn of them. If you have something to offer, let me know.
I approach the issue of rabbinic officiation at gay and lesbian commitment ceremonies from three different points:
First, how does the biblical text present homosexual acts?
Our tradition's approach to homosexuality begins in the book of Leviticus.
What is the meaning of Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 addressed to the Israelite male community:
These verses prohibit "Mishkav Zakhar (to lie with a man as with a woman)" as a "To'evah (abhorrence)" because: "It is by such that the nations that I am casting out before you defiled themselves. [Leviticus 18:24]"
What kind of a society does the author of Leviticus want us to create when he/she instructs us in Leviticus 18 and 20?
We don't know exactly. The text doesn't offer an overview how this society is to appear, however we can extrapolate from some of the details presented.
While presuming polygamy the author prohibits a variety of practices including incest, adultery, bestiality and child sacrifice in the same list as "Mishkav Zakhar".
The text expresses all this in the context of creating a community that is
Kadosh the word we most often translate as "holy".
Certain behaviors are acceptable and others are not acceptable, performing only the acceptable ones makes us into a holy community.
According to Torah, homosexual acts do not lead to holiness.
Second, the development of the ceremony of Kiddushin.
After the end of the biblical period, the earliest rabbis created the wedding ceremony of Kiddushin. They did so primarily for two economic reasons:
Still presuming a polygamous society (which was legal among European Jews until the eleventh century and among Jews of Asia and Africa until they came to the State of Israel only fifty years ago), the man "separates" a specific woman out from the others and she is to have an exclusive relation with him. She is "set aside" for him.
The idea that Kiddushin has a "hallowed" or "spiritual" dimension is a modern accretion to the ceremony.
Until recent years, all you needed for Kiddushin to be valid are two witnesses to the event. In order to assure that everything was done correctly the Jewish community looked to someone to "organize" the matter. Over the years the Jewish community has increasingly looked to the rabbi as "M'sader Kiddushin" (the organizer of the wedding). This expectation of the rabbi is now so great that the rabbi has (for the purpose of organizing marriages-even though it is the caterer who does this now) become a representative of the secular state. Yet, the rabbi has not been necessary for Kiddushin in the first place! This has increasingly confused the true task of the rabbi, making him/her a "maître d'" at a five star Kosher-style restaurant or a "pump-boy" at a corner service station instead of the teacher and decisor of appropriate Jewish practice.
To function in this manner, which many Jews have now begun to requesst, means for rabbis to become social workers rather than rabbis. The Gay community (and I must add that the Gay community is not alone in this development) has asked us rabbis to enable people to fulfil themselves rather than live according to what our heritage has understood to be God's wishes.
The fact that the rabbi acts as the representative of the state adds a complication. So long as the state prohibits the formalization of same sex liaisons, those who expect rabbis to officiate at such ceremonies push the rabbi into the untenable situation of breaking the law of the land. Some have argued in this context that the situation of a gay or lesbian couple who desire to formalize their relationship is
"analogous to two people on SSI or SSDI who wanted to sanctify their relationship but couldn't for fear of losing their benefits," and would therefore "perform some kind of ceremony so long as everyone understands that it is not [a] legal marriage in the civil sense...."
However, the difference between these two situations is that the couple on SSI or SSDI do not want their status before the state to change, while the gay or lesbian couple want just the opposite. They want to make their relationship official for the purpose of it being recognized by the state!
Let me interject here that I do not oppose the secular authority recognizing gay and lesbian relationships. This is important for the purpose of adoptions, and, as others have stated: "medical decisions for a partner too ill to make such decisions and to obtain joint insurance policies for health, home and auto...." among other issues. What the secular state does is one thing. How I respond as a rabbi in Israel is something else and need not have any relation to what the secular state does.
Finally, how do we understand homosexuality in relation to God's design for the world?
Many gay and lesbian individuals ask how God could make a world in which they exist "by mistake." If they exist as "predetermined homoerotic beings", the argument goes, God must have made them that way. How can God make lesbians and gays (on purpose, the way they are) and then tell them that they may not live their lives fully as they experience them?
This argument presumes two things:
The first argument (that homosexuality is biologically determined), while not an authority on the matter I find has deep flaws. If it is biological, and if we say that (to use gay and lesbian activist numbers) approximately 10% of the general population are exclusively homosexual we should expect to find--throughout history, especially in those societies that did not frown on homosexual acts, some evidence of exclusively homosexual relationships.
However, in an article by Rabbi Brad Artson in which he refers to extensive research by David Greenberg published by Chicago University Press he reports that "antiquity knew of no exclusive, committed homosexual relationships between equals." If, as this argument goes, homosexuality is natural and normal for 10% of the population I would expect to find some evidence of exclusive homosexual relationships in antiquity as well as in contemporary societies in which homosexual acts are not discouraged.
As to the second argument, regarding God's intentions in creating the world, the thoughts of Rabbi Leonard Kravitz (in his rejoinder to Rabbi Yoel Kahn at the 1988 CCAR convention in which he offers a particularly rich illustration) have received too little consideration. Rabbi Kravitz suggests, and I agree, that what is part of the natural world is not necessarily Jewish. We don't fully understand many things in this world God has created:
We know we should not smoke, we are not to eat pork or fish without fins and scales, the world would be (arguably) better off, were the atom not released, and we still have not found an appropriate outlet for greed.
In addition we know that just because we have an ability to do something does not mean that we should.
The Jewish way may be different from the ways of the nations, as it often is.
Some argue that because we are "liberal" Jews and are ready to give the past a vote but not a veto (a Reconstructionist line [thank you Mordecai M. Kaplan] but they are liberals too) we can change our practice in this matter.
After all, we have changed
However, there is a clear distinction between these two instances and that of recognizing the legitimacy of same-sex marriages. In the case enabling a woman to become a rabbi we have the clear biblical precedent of (if not rabbinic leadership) women as prophets and judges (Miriam, Deborah, Hulda). In the second case, that of patrilineal descent we have the examples of Joseph whose sons were the sons of a daughter of an Egyptian priest and Moses whose sons were the sons of a daughter of a Midianite priest. You can search in vain through the Bible or our history for any example of a pairing of people of the same sex.
For those who want to point to David and Jonathan, this brief reference to their friendship sheds no light on the matter. David was already married to Jonathan's sister Mikhal and lived a rich, intensely heterosexual life after Jonathan's death. The other similar example offered, that of Ruth and Naomi also has nothing to do with homosexuality. This is the care of a mother-in-law for her daughter-in-law. Both women were previously involved in heterosexual marriages. At the beginning of the story Naomi presumes that Ruth wants another husband and might consider waiting and later Ruth goes on to marry Boaz. In fact, the whole purpose of the story would be destroyed if the two women would be lesbians and prefer their own company.
I do not pretend to know the solution to these questions I have raised, but I want to stand rooted here within the ways of our people.
I will not officiate at same-sex commitment ceremonies.
| Last modified on May 30, 1997 | © Mark Hurvitz |